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The prevailing Eurocentric perspective on Mediterranean migration lies almost exclusively in 
the security paradigm, focusing upon African illegal migration to Europe and disregarding the 
role of migration in the socio-economic development of the African continent. The older 
emigration histories of North African countries are diverse, with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria 
linked to France as a destination country, Libya as an immigration country, and Egypt linked 
with other Arab countries for temporary migration alongside permanent migration to 
Anglophone countries. More recent changes include the emergence of southern Europe as 
destination countries for all except Libyans, and all of North Africa turned into transit 
countries for migrants from the sub-Sahara and Asia. 
 
The “new migrations” from and through North Africa are described, along with known major 
migration routes and data on interceptions of illegal migrants by southern European 
countries. North African policy responses are also identified, noting especially the failure of 
all countries in the region to observe international human rights standards. Finally, I outline 
the “failed policy” of the European Union, which simply continues the securitization approach 
previously pursued by Spain and Italy, neglecting the fundamental realities of Africa as a 
new continent of emigration. Furthermore, European policy promotes the human rights 
abuses of North Africa with regard to illegal migrants and asylum-seekers, yet welcomes 
skilled (as opposed to semi-skilled) African migrants to European territory. Europe thus 
guarantees the continuation of African underdevelopment – seeking to avoid its negative 
symptom of mass emigration and asylum-seeking whilst benefiting from the migration to 
Europe of skilled African workers. 
 
 
Conventional narratives about migration and North Africa tend to emphasise the role 
of demography in shaping emigration pressures, ignore the significance of Libya as a 
guestworker country for the region, and completely disregard the importance of 
forced migrations throughout Africa. Furthermore, the complex interconnectedness 
of migrations and socio-economic development in Africa is somehow lost in 
Eurocentric approaches. Such approaches can be found at their very worst in the 
policies and analyses of the European Commission, or the Barcelona Declaration: 
they focus upon illegal African migration to Europe, advocate a policy of ‘root causes’ 
of migration which can be remedied with economic aid, and hail migrant workers’ 
remittances as a panacea for faltering economies (whilst ignoring the massive and 
serious loss of skilled workers from many countries in the region).  
 
Recent events have only worsened the deficiencies of the European perspective, 
since the most visible manifestation of changing migration patterns has become a 
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physical challenge to the integrity of Europe’s external borders. Whether it be 
through ‘boatpeople’ crossing the Mediterranean, or the climbing of the security 
fences in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the response of the EU is the 
same – “send them back”. Thus, detailed legal provisions known as readmission 
treaties are being forced upon all countries bordering the EU, naval patrols and 
frontiers reinforced, and increasing emphasis laid upon detection and deportation of 
illegal immigrants and even refoulement of asylum-seekers. The ability of North 
Africa to manage all aspects of migration, especially transit migration of people from 
sub-Sahara and even Asia, is now central. In particular, the treatment of illegal 
migrants, returned migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and guestworkers have been 
shown by all independent sources to be at best inadequate, at worst profoundly 
inhuman.  
 
In this paper, I set myself the ambitious task of exploring some of the linkages 
between different facets of migration, and how three different regions (northern 
Mediterranean, southern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)) are actually 
intimately connected through migration. Some theoretical considerations are also 
outlined, since migration and socio-economic development are closely related – even 
if the complex relationship defies the identification of universal truths. Finally, I 
conclude with an examination of European policy, and its failure to grapple with 
Mediterranean or African socio-economic imperatives. 
 
 
A Short History of North Africa and Emigration 
Of the four Maghreb countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya), Morocco has 
been the only one since 1968 with a consistent policy of encouraging emigration in 
order to manage unemployment levels (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 4). Even after the 
oil-shock and the closure of European labour markets to immigration in 1974, 
Morocco maintained its policy stance of promoting emigration, opposition to the 
integration of Moroccans abroad, and great emphasis on the remittances received 
from the Moroccan diaspora (Fargues, 2004: 1359). Most migrants did not return, 
and massive family reunification to European countries in the 1970s and 1980s led to 
an increase in Moroccans from 400,000 in 1975 to over one million in 1992 in 
France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany. By 1998, the number had risen to 1.6 
million in northern Europe, and despite the opposition of the Moroccan state,   3
430,000 were granted EU nationality over the period 1992-2001 (de Haas, 2005a). 
With new Moroccan migrations to Spain and Italy after 1990, the resulting diaspora 
by 2004 was measured at over 3 million worldwide (over 10% of current population) 
– with 2.6 million in wider Europe and 280,000 in other Arab countries (Sadiqi, 
2005).  
 
Tunisia started with the same sort of approach as Morocco in the late 1960s, but by 
1974 the state was encouraging the return of its nationals (Fargues, 2004: 1359). 
Despite this official policy, the number of Tunisians abroad by 2003 was in excess of 
800,000 (Zekri, 2005; CARIM, 2005: 315), around 9% of current population, with 
over 700,000 in greater Europe, mostly in France. 
 
Algeria from the outset was more ambiguous about emigration as a safety-valve for 
the labour market, preferring to denounce migration as a post-colonial form of 
dependency and instead relying upon development of its oil and gas reserves 
(Fargues, 2004: 1359). Its policy left the diaspora highly disconnected from the 
country, and also explains the relatively low rate of refugee flows during the civil war 
in the 1990s. By 2000, over 800,000 Algerians were recorded (CARIM, 2005: 374-6) 
mostly in France – constituting just under 3% of current population. 
 
Libya has a rather different history of migration policy. Owing to the development of 
its oil and a high per capita GDP, it was always a destination country for labour 
migrants. Some limited temporary emigration occurred, mostly of businessmen and 
students to Malta and Egypt (NDI, 2005: 27); since Libya removed formal travel 
restrictions, there has been increasing travel by young people to Italy and Malta. 
However, the Libyan diaspora is very small. On the other hand, the number and 
proportion of immigrants in Libya is high: estimates range from 1.1-1.4 million (NDI, 
2005) up to 1.8 million, of which only 600,000 are legal workers (EC, 2004: 5). With 
a total recorded population of around 5.5m, this means that the immigrant/ 
population ratio is of the order of 25-30%. The majority of temporary workers 
traditionally have come from Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, although more recent visa-
free entry for all of Africa resulted also in large numbers of sub-Saharan Africans 
(NDI, 2005: 29). 
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Egypt too has a rather different migration history from the other North African 
countries. Emigration was prohibited until 1967, after which followed a short period 
of state-organized temporary labour migration to other Arab countries, mainly in the 
Gulf. Finally, in 1971 legal restrictions on emigration were removed. Abella (1994: 
168) identifies three phases of emigration of Egyptians: to Libya, in the early 1970s; 
to Saudi Arabia, in the late 1970s; and to Iraq, peaking in 1984. Since then, 
temporary migration flows have been focused on Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan and 
Kuwait, with an equal mix of skilled and unskilled workers. Unskilled workers 
predominate in Saudi Arabia – the main receiving country – whereas skilled workers 
are the majority for almost all other countries of the region (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 
8). Permanent emigrants choose mainly Anglophone countries (USA, Canada, 
Australia) along with Italy and Greece, and are thought to number about 800,000; 
the estimated number of temporary migrants to nearby countries is 1.9 million. Thus, 
total emigration as of 2002 constituted around 4% of current population. 
 
Egypt also has substantial unrecognized refugee stocks (from Sudan, Somalia and 
Palestine), which could be as high as 5 million, making the country clearly a net 
immigration country (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 8).  
 
For all four Maghreb countries, transit migration (into Europe) and immigration from 
sub-Saharan Africa and even Asia have recently created serious problems. There are 
also some informal indications that Egypt is slowly transforming into a transit region, 
although data are unavailable. 
 
 
Some Theoretical Considerations 
Demography and Migration 
The older literature on migration (e.g. Ravenstein, 1885), along with occasional 
contemporary approaches, tended to assume that population growth has a direct 
correlation with propensity to migrate. In other words, a high birth rate would lead 
(with lag) to high emigration, whereas low population growth would not (or might 
require immigration). This approach to migration has now been abandoned in the 
mainstream literature, with adequate empirical evidence to show that globally there 
is zero correlation. Zlotnik, for example, shows that for 164 countries “there is no 
simple or unidirectional relation between natural increase and net migration”   5
(Zlotnik, 2004a: 33) and that even for countries with high levels of natural increase 
both net immigration and net emigration can be observed. 
 
On the other hand, demographic developments clearly have some role to play in the 
socio-economic pressures shaping emigration patterns. Afolayan (2001: 10) lists – 
along with the demographic issues of population growth and population density – 
economic vulnerability and debt, socio-cultural issues, ecological disasters, social 
networking, government migration policies and regional economic integration. In the 
specific case of Africa, Adepoju considers the determinants of emigration to be 
categorizable under the headings of labour force growth, economic decline and debt, 
ethnopolitical conflict and ecological deterioration. In this context, emigration should 
be seen as a survival strategy by individuals and families (Adepojou, 2004: 65).  
 
In a similar vein, the World Bank notes that low-skilled migration can improve labour 
market conditions for other poor workers (World Bank, 2006a: 64) and even high-
skilled emigration can sometimes be beneficial for countries of origin (World Bank, 
2006a: 67). These considerations are crucial for North Africa, which still has high 
fertility rates in all but Tunisia (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 26) and annual projected 
labour force growth to 2020 of 2-3% in Algeria and Egypt, 1.5-2.5% in Libya and 
Morocco, and  1-2.5% in Tunisia.
1 In all these countries, male labour force 
participation is expected to remain stable, but with significant increases of female 
participation in Algeria and Egypt. The ability of their economies to absorb the new 
workforce (rather than simple population increases) will be a crucial determinant of 
future emigration pressures. 
 
Migration and Development 
The relationship between migration and socio-economic development is neither 
simple nor unidirectional. Emigration is somehow connected with income disparities 
between countries of emigration and immigration, but very low income countries 
tend to have very low emigration. Equally, the temporary relief provided to strained 
labour markets is a short-term help, whereas the loss of workers – especially high-
skilled ones – is an impediment to longer-run economic development. Also, workers’ 
remittances from abroad are now increasingly seen as a new development “mantra” 
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(de Haas, 2005b: 1276), especially since recent years have seen declining 
development aid alongside increasing migrants’ remittances to LDCs.   
 
Recent scholarship is inclined to see [voluntary] international migration as a stage of 
development, indicating a transition from a very low level of development to an 
upper-lower income level. According to this view, migration stems not from 
underdevelopment but from development itself. There is much to commend this 
view, since historically Africa has exhibited high refugee movements within the 
region – 30% as of 2000 (Zlotnik, 2004b) – whilst emigration rates have been fairly 
low from all but the Maghreb. Generally, the world’s main labour exporters are upper 
lower to lower-middle income countries such as North Africa or the Philippines (de 
Haas, 2005c: 4). Olesen (2002) names this range of low-middle income and high 
emigration countries as the “migration band”, above which emigration tends to 
diminish. He posits the explanation as the reduced differential in income levels 
between emigration and immigration countries ($PPP), citing ratios from 1:3 to 1:4.5 
(Olesen, 2002: 141). Olesen also suggests that Morocco is ready to exit the 
migration band, and economic development will reduce its emigration. 
 
Although historically most sub-Saharan migration was intra-continental, since the 
mid-1990s emigration rates have increased significantly. Gubert (2005: 41) gives net 
migration rates for 1995-2000 of 6.2% for Guinea, 5.5% for Burkina Faso, 4.7% for 
Mali and 3.4% for Lesotho. In recent years, emigration outside the continent has 
taken off: this trend is unsurprising, since internal migration possibilities diminished 
with worsening economies, and South-South labour migration (e.g. to Gulf countries) 
options were reduced (Adepoju, 2004). Thus, ‘migration for survival’ has emerged as 
a composite type – somehow straddling the western categories of forced and 
voluntary labour migrations, but crudely classed as “illegal” (Sandell, 2005). The 
impact of migrant remittances for sub-Sahara is now such that one analyst states 
that “all local development is based on emigration” (Sall, 2005: 265).  
 
 
Remittances versus Brain Drain – some empirical data 
For the last two decades, remittances to North Africa have constituted the highest 
ratio to GDP of any region in the world: in 2002, they were 3.1% of GDP compared 
with 1.6% for Latin America or 0.6% for sub-Saharan Africa (Baldwin-Edwards,   7
2005: 23). However, the IMF figures do not cover informal transfers: in the case of 
North Africa, this is probably not such a serious problem of data, but for sub-Saharan 
African countries there is a consensus that the data substantially underestimate the 
transfers (Gubert, 2005: 43; Moré, 2005: 4-5). Gubert gives an unsourced figure of 
1.3% of GDP for remittances to the region, whilst Sall (2005: 277) provides 1990s 
data showing remittances ranging between 2% GDP for Senegal up to 20% for 
Eritrea! Whatever the actual level of remittances, it is certain that they constitute a 
major source of external development funding for the region.  
 
In the case of North African countries (other than Libya), for some time remittances 
have played a major role in economic policy and economic stability. Although 
Morocco remains one of the largest recipients of remittances, in excess of tourism 
receipts for 2004, its significance as a proportion of GDP is likely to decline from the 
current high level of 10%. Algeria reports a tripling in remittances over 2001-4 
(World Bank, 2006a: 87), although exact data are not provided.  
 
As with remittance data, reliable information on the emigration of skilled workers is 
in very short supply. Recent research undertaken separately by the OECD and World 
Bank on stocks and flows of skilled migrants make some contribution to remedying 
the deficit
i. Table 1 below gives data for North Africa, from the OECD database. 
 
Table 1 
Total number of expatriates and proportion of highly-skilled in OECD countries, by country of birth 
Country  Total number of expatriates  Of which: highly skilled (%) 
Algeria 1,301,076  16.4 
Egypt 274,833  51.2 
Libya 27,481  43.4 
Morocco 1,364,754  14.8 
Tunisia 371,274  17.7 
SOURCE: OECD (2005: Table II.A2.6) 
 
 
Several things stand out from this table. First, the total numbers do not correspond 
with the data given earlier, on diaspora populations. There are significantly more 
Algerians abroad, and rather fewer Tunisians and Egyptians than could be expected   8
in OECD countries. Secondly, the proportions of highly-skilled are not so high for 
Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians; the ratio is high for the small number of 
Libyans, but this was expected, and is also very high for Egyptians. This latter 
problem is probably because of no data from Italy as a receiving country and 
doubtless poor data from Greece – both important countries for the Egyptian 
diaspora. Overall, there does not appear to be a significant brain-drain from North 
Africa. Data for sub-Saharan countries show a different pattern, with ratios ranging 
from 25-40%, suggesting a problem of emigration of the highly skilled from the rest 
of Africa. 
 
The World Bank database is not published in full, but some partial datasets are 
shown in tabular form (World Bank, 2006b: ch. 5). One indicator of a serious 
problem with skilled emigration, is the proportion of a country’s skilled workforce 
which has emigrated. North Africa is not prominent in the list, but several African 
countries are: Gambia (63%), Sierra Leone (53%), Ghana (47%), Liberia (45%), 
Kenya (38%), Uganda (36%), Angola (33%), Somalia (33%). Morocco is shown as 
having lost 17% of its skilled workforce: presumably the other North African 
countries are below 15%, the lowest proportion shown in the table. 
 
The database also shows the proportion of highly-skilled as part of total migration. 
Here, Egypt is shown with 59%. However, the data also show Egypt with a low 
emigration rate for its skilled workforce (4.6%) along with Libya (2.4%). Taken 
together, these data show that emigration from Egypt and Libya is highly selective 
and low relative to total population and also to the skilled workforce.  
 
Both datasets show fairly reliably that there is not a serious problem of brain-drain 
for any North African country; unfortunately, the same cannot be said for much of 
the rest of Africa. Recent empirical data and focused research projects tend to 
confirm the picture described by both the OECD and World Bank datasets. El-Khawas 
(2004: 44) cites data of 60% of Gambia’s university graduates, 25% of Sierra 
Leone’s, and 10% of Kenya’s, as United States residents. Tanner (2005: 3) cites an 
older estimate from Stalker that between 1960-87, Africa lost 30% of its skilled 
workforce. In particular, two sectors show massive emigration rates from SSA – 
healthcare and education. Mensah et al. (2005: 14) in a detailed study of migration 
of health professionals, estimate that Ghana has lost over 50% of its trained doctors.   9
Bump (2006) cites detailed annual data 1995-2002 from the University of Ghana, 
showing that by 2002 the emigration rate of doctors was over 90%, of pharmacists 
over 60%, and of nurses at 20%.  
 
 
The New Migrations and North Africa 
North African economies cannot be described as doing particularly well, with Libya’s 
per capita GDP the highest at $3,500
2 for 2002, Tunisia at $6,800 (PPP), Algeria at 
$5,800 (PPP), and both Egypt and Morocco at $3,800 (PPP) (UNDP, 2004). However, 
in comparison with the majority of African countries even North Africa looks 
prosperous, and it is moreover closer to Europe and therefore a stepping stone to a 
better life. Thus, in recent years, North African countries have attracted significant 
numbers of African and also some Asian migrants: most fail to cross the 
Mediterranean and reach the European continent and remain in very poor conditions 
in North Africa. 
 
What was once a tolerated income supplement for cash-starved Spanish fishermen 
with their pateras [small fishing boats], has turned since the mid-1990s into a more 
serious phenomenon of organised smuggling or individual attempts to cross the 
Mediterranean and reach prosperous ‘Europe’. One of the earliest accounts of 
“Mediterranean Boat People” (Pugh 2001) gives a figure of illegal migrants 
intercepted by Spain for 1996 as 1,573, but rapidly escalating to 15,000 in 2000 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). The figure peaked in 2003 at 19,176, and stood at 11,781 
persons for 2005 (APDHA, 2006: 12). In the case of arrivals in Italy, for 2003 Italy 
recorded 14,017 arrivals from North Africa; by 2004, this had decreased to 12,737 
illegal migrants in 231 boats (van Selm and Cooper, 2006: 62). Most arrived on the 
small island of Lampedusa, close to Libya and Tunisia. Malta recorded 1,369 boat 
arrivals in 2004, which although a small number is proportionately a larger problem 
for the island. 
 
ICMPD
3 has identified three main illegal migration routes into southern Europe: the 
West African route, the North and East African route, and the Eastern Mediterranean 
route (ICMPD, 2005). For the West African route, the main points of arrival are the 
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3 The International Centre for Migration Policy Development – an intergovernmental agency based in 
Vienna, with a specific focus on border management and illegal migration issues.   10
Spanish island of Fuerteventura (Canary Islands), the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla, and the southern Spanish coast adjacent to Morocco. Most departures are 
from Morocco, although some are from the Western Sahara. For the North and East 
African route, the main points of arrival are the Italian islands of Lampedusa, 
Pantelleria, Linosa, Sicily and also Malta. The main point of departure is Libya, but 
also Egypt. For the Eastern Mediterranean Route, the main transit country is Turkey. 
From southern Turkey, boats cross to Italy and Cyprus; from western Turkey, boats 
cross to the numerous small Greek Aegean islands; and from Istanbul, crossing the 
River Evros effects entry into Greek territory. 
 
The nationalities of the migrants are not so well documented (and are frequently 
concealed to avoid deportation), but ICMPD  estimated for 2003 that about 25% 
were sub-Saharan, another 25% from other countries, mainly Asian, and about 50% 
from the south or east Mediterranean (ICMPD 2004). 2004 data for Italy show an 
increasing proportion of Egyptians (60%) and about 28% sub-Saharans (EC 
2005a:38), whilst for Malta the principal nationality in 2004 was Somali (40%) 
followed by Egyptian (15%) and Eritrean (15%). Spanish apprehensions at sea over 
2004 were, according to the European Commission (EC 2005b: 5) mainly of sub-
Saharan nationals: the main countries of origin were Mali and Gambia, with smaller 
numbers from Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria and 
Guinea Buissau. A few hundred Indians and Bangladeshi were also apprehended. 
Spanish data for 2005 show that of 368 corpses or missing persons, 267 were sub-
Saharan, 85 from the Maghreb and 16 from Western Sahara (APDHA, 2006: 15).  
 
In the two temporary reception centres in Ceuta and Melilla, in late 2005 some 2,000 
persons were detained. 61% were from sub-Saharan countries, of which the most 
numerous were those from Mali (23%) and Cameroons (7%), although there were 
also smaller numbers from the entire region including Guinea Bissau, Guinea and 
Ghana. 18% of those detained were from India, and 17% from Algeria.
4 A small 
subsample of the sub-Saharan migrants by educational level showed that over 20% 
were university graduates and another 46% had a reasonable level of education (EC, 
2005b: Annex 2, Table 5). Most of them had reached Morocco via the land border 
with Algeria.  
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North African Policy Responses 
(i) Morocco 
Morocco views immigration policy as mainly a security policy, with the country now 
not only a transit country but also a de facto destination country (Sadiqi, 2005: 227). 
Law No. 02/2003 on the entry and stay of foreigners, illegal emigration and 
immigration came into force in November 2003. Trafficking in migrants was 
criminalized, and there are also some rights of foreigners granted. Also in 2003 two 
new institutions were created – the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance 
(Interior Ministry) and a Migration Observatory (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004).  
 
Data on legally present immigrants show only 60,837 for 2002, with some 28,000 
from Europe and 25,000 from Africa of which 14,000 are from Algeria and just under 
2,000 from Tunisia (CARIM, 2005: 233-6). Morocco’s record on asylum-seekers and 
refugees is poor (Lindstrom, 2002) and it has also recently been denounced by a 
detailed report from Human Rights Watch on the abuse of child domestic workers 
(HRW, 2005). 
 
Collaboration with Spain, including liaison officers in various regions of Spain and to 
the S.I.V.E. system of naval surveillance, has been extensive and apparently 
successful in reducing emigration and transit migration from Morocco (Sadiqi, 2005: 
228). Table 2 shows interceptions of illegal migrants, 2000-2004. From these figures, 
it seems that control over the illegal emigration of Moroccans improved from 2003 
(the year of increased state activity in the area). Other reports (e.g. Daoud, 2005) 
suggest that progress was made over 2004 in dismantling smuggling networks, and 
2005 saw further reductions in illegal migration. 
 
Table 2 
Interceptions of illegal migrants in Morocco, 2000-2004 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Moroccans  9,353 13,327 16,034 12,493 9,353
Foreigners  15,056 13,100 15,363 23,851 17,252
TOTAL 24,409  26,427  31,397 36,344 26,605
SOURCE: CARIM (2005: 236) 
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Morocco has readmission agreements with both Spain and Italy, and since 2004 
accepted the return of sub-Saharan illegal migrants from Spain (Baldwin-Edwards, 
2004). Morocco has also undertaken co-operation with Nigeria on readmission of 
illegal migrants; in 2004, Nigeria sent five aeroplanes to transfer 1,700 Nigerians 
residing illegally in Morocco (Daoud, 2005; Sadiqi, 2005). However, the more usual 
state response is either to imprison the illegal migrants or refugees, or simply to 
evict them from Moroccan territory into the desert of Algeria (Daoud, 2005). Violence 
by Moroccan state authorities against illegal migrants is well-documented by 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, 2005) and constitutes a further worry concerning 
the “security approach” that Morocco has been encouraged to adopt. MSF notes that 
out of 2,193 cases (2003-5) of sub-Saharan nationals being treated for medical 
conditions caused by physical violence, 52% were caused by Moroccan security 
services, 29% by criminal networks and 15% by Spanish security services. 
 
 
(ii) Algeria 
Algeria has no co-operation with the EU, nor with Morocco (EC 2005b: 11), although 
it does participate in the 5+5 Mediterranean Dialogue, managed by IOM
5. For 2003 
and 2004, the number of illegal immigrants arrested was 4,870 and 5,680 
respectively (Labdelaoui, 2005: 87). Algeria has signed readmission agreements with 
Spain and Italy, but information on their operation is not available, 
 
1998 Census data show some 72,000 foreigners residing in Algeria, of which 58,000 
were from Arab states, 5,000 from Europe and 7,000 from non-Arab African 
countries (CARIM, 2005: 90). 
 
 
(iii) Tunisia 
Tunisia, like Morocco, has recently passed new laws to deal with illegal migration. 
Two laws passed in early 2004 aim to limit illegal migration and associated criminal 
networks. One law allows closer surveillance of vessels and also regulates the 
ownership of these and sets out rules for mooring in ports (Boubakri, 2004: 23). The 
other law amends a 1975 law on passports and travel documents; its sanctions for 
directly or indirectly aiding illegal migration are punitive, with up to 20 years’ 
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imprisonment and fines of up to 67,000 Euros. Tunisia has a readmission agreement 
with Italy, which also covers the return of non-nationals. No data are available on 
the operation of the agreement. 
 
There is a small number of foreigners residing legally on the territory: as of 2004, 
they numbered 35,192 of which 9, 612 were Algerian, 6,363 Moroccan, and 4,612 
French. From sub-Saharan Africa, the small numbers total just over 1,000 persons 
(CARIM, 2005: 317). 
 
 
(iv) Libya 
Libya has effectively no immigration policy. There is no clear distinction between 
legal and illegal immigrants, no asylum procedure of system of protection for 
refugees, it has not ratified the Geneva Convention on refugees and it does not 
recognize the UNHCR. Libya has not been part of the Barcelona Process and has no 
formal relations with the EU (EC 2005a; EP 2005). In 2005, two new institutional 
bodies were created – a passport and control department, and a coastguard service. 
An anti-trafficking law was also passed in 2005, with a maximum penalty of one 
year’s imprisonment (EP 2005: 10). Libya does have bilateral agreements with 
several EU countries (including Italy) and illegal migrants returned to Libya are then 
deported to their own country of origin, without legal process at any stage. 
 
As discussed above, Libya has a large illegal immigrant population – of which a great 
part is sub-Saharan. In 2003, Libya expelled some 43,000 migrants, of which 38% 
were Egyptian, 15% Nigers and over 33% sub-Saharan (EC 2005a: 38). For 2004, 
the verbal statement made to the EP delegation by the relevant senior public official, 
stated that 75,000 had been repatriated, of which 17,000 were Nigers, 11,000 
Ghanaians, 7,000 Nigerians, 5,000 Egyptians and 3,000 Sudanese (EP 2005: 9). 
However, it is thought that most of the illegal immigrants residing in Libya are not 
transit migrants, but simply looking for work. Given the lack of basic immigration 
infrastructure, there is no mechanism to distinguish between different motivations or 
types of migrant. 
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(v) Egypt 
Egypt essentially has no immigration policy: entry to Egyptian territory is seen as 
primarily a security matter. Responsibility for non-nationals and foreign workers is 
divided between a large number of ministries, with frequent problems of co-
ordination (Sawi, 2005: 106).  
 
There is a small number of legally resident aliens in Egypt – as of the 1996 Census, 
some 116,000. The largest numbers are of Sudanese, Palestinians, and Russians 
(CARIM, 2005: 110-113). However, as noted above there are thought to be millions 
of unrecognized refugees, who will be, in most respects, indistinguishable from illegal 
immigrants. There is still no domestic legislation or effective protection of asylum-
seekers, the responsibility for which is given to UNHCR (Roman, 2006: 19-24) with 
the presumption of relocation to a third country. The state violence against Sudanese 
asylum-seekers in December 2005 was largely the result of friction between UNHCR 
and the Egyptian Interior Ministry, with strong protests from Egyptian human rights 
groups about the criminal behaviour of the Ministry with the deaths of up to 100 
asylum-seekers (Roman, 2006: 23). 
 
Egypt does not have any readmission treaties with southern European countries, 
although one is under discussion with Turkey. Information on Egypt’s role in illegal 
migration movements is almost completely absent, although Sawi (2005: 2-3) 
reports that the Interior Ministry maintains records on irregular migrants and 
regularly collaborates with Interpol and foreign powers on these issues. 
 
 
A Failed Policy for Europe 
Throughout the recent history of the EU there has been a remarkable one-sided 
emphasis on the security aspects of immigration control [borders, asylum, expulsion 
of illegal migrants] and an almost complete absence of even co-ordination of policy 
on immigration for employment, issues of legalisation of illegal immigrants, and until 
recently on the rights of long-term immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). Looking 
specifically at three issues relevant to southern Europe, by early 2006 there was no 
EU policy on admission of immigrants (other than the Schengen rules for visitors), 
there was substantial policy on removal of illegal immigrants (but nothing on   15
legalization of undocumented immigrants), and also substantial policy on asylum-
seeking.  
 
In 2003, the UK started to suggest a new vision of refugee protection, which 
included the notion of ‘transit camps’ (van Selm, 2005:16). Most of these ideas were 
withdrawn in the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki, but by June 2004 the 
European Commission had made clear its intent to propose a new policy regime. The 
UK and also German/Italian proposals were rejected in 2004 by the European 
Parliament  (Schuster, 2005:5): those proposals essentially consisted of keeping the 
majority of refugees outside of Europe, and in particular, in North Africa.  
 
Following opposition not only from the EP but also from many EU member states, 
Italy independently pursued bilateral arrangements with Morocco, Tunisia and Libya 
– essentially linking re-admission agreements with development aid and small-scale 
immigration quotas (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 32-35). In October 2004, Italy returned 
1.000 people, without allowing them to claim asylum, to Libya, which in turn, 
deported them to Egypt and Nigeria (Schuster, 2005:12). As Libya does not 
recognise the Geneva Convention or apply the OAU asylum procedures (EC 
2005a:52), this meant that effectively the migrants were denied the right to asylum 
even though they had arrived in an EU country. The European Parliament in April 
2005 passed a resolution effectively condemning as illegal the Italian expulsions from 
Lampedusa carried out between October 2004 and March 2005. Similarly, UNHCR 
condemned an incident with 180 people on 17 March 2005. Other expulsions 
continued later in 2005, although with smaller numbers (Hamood, 2006: 66).  
 
The recent report of the Commission (EC 2005a) makes no mention of these serious 
problems with “safe third countries” such as Libya, whilst admitting that “the EU has 
no formal relations with Libya…Libya is not a member of the Barcelona Process…and 
there is no avenue for a formal dialogue on migration management” (EC 2005a:5). 
The report also notes that Tunisia has no functioning asylum system, but 
nevertheless the EC intends to include it in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Action Plan. In the case of Morocco, the main concern of the Commission seems to 
be that they have been unable to conclude a re-admission agreement  to cover non-
nationals (unlike Spain, which has concluded such).  
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In the absence of coherent policy initiatives from the EU, Spain and Italy have 
pursued their own national agendas, which has resulted in “an increasing 
‘militarization’ of migration and crime control along the EU’s Mediterranean borders” 
(Lutterbeck, 2006: 64). In the case of Spain, the ‘bloodbath’ that occurred on the 
frontier of the Spanish enclave of Melilla in October 2005 was symbolic of the 
frustration of African migrants and the legitimized state violence which has arisen 
from Spanish-Moroccan collusion (Mead, 2005). For Italy, the collusion with Libya 
takes a different form, which includes the financing of a detention camp in northern 
Libya, and provision for two more in the South. Italy also finances the repatriation 
flights from Libya to country of origin (including Eritrea). Detailed lists of provisions 
include such macabre items as “1,000 sacks for transport of corpses” (Trucco, 2005: 
3).  
 
The current EU agenda recycles all the old baggage which serious analysts 
discredited years ago (such as the “root causes of migration”), whilst spouting nice 
rhetoric about eradicating poverty, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
In reality, the latest policy document (EC 2005c) is concerned only with security 
measures (such as coastal patrols, FRONTEX, more detection technology, better 
management of migration for North African countries, readmission agreements) 
whilst paying lipservice to the fundamental problems faced by African economies. 
Emphasis is placed on “political dialogue” (EC 2005c: 6-7), specifically focused on the 
following: 
 
Remittances [the EU will try to reduce bank transfer charges] 
Capacity-building [legal and technical infrastructure to stop migration] 
Management of migration flows and skills [to “raise awareness of legal 
channels for migration” to EU states] 
Improving integration in destination countries [possibly this means trying to 
get EU states to obey the anti-discrimination directives and the directive on the 
rights of long-term immigrants] 
 
Essentially, Europe fiddles while Africa burns. Southern European countries in 
particular, but even northern European, have some limited demand for semi-skilled 
and unskilled immigrant workers. For the past two decades, this demand has been 
filled by illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers; more recently, by Romanians and   17
Bulgarians migrating as ‘false tourists’ under Schengen rules, and then working 
illegally (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). The expansion of Europe to the East has badly 
damaged Africa’s chances of labour migration and associated economic 
development: the cynical reaction of the European continent is to blame Africa for 
the logical outcome of European policies. Basically, there are no legal channels for 
semi-skilled labour migration to Europe, although the developed world continues to 
rely heavily on skilled migrants trained in Africa, and the European Union offers 
Africa nothing more than “political dialogue”. 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i Both the OECD and World Bank datasets on skilled expatriates are based primarily upon detailed 
population stock data from the OECD area, of which only a few countries are unable to provide such 
data [Italy, Greece, Turkey et al.]. The World Bank methodology is described in detail in World Bank 
(2006b), pp. 155-196. Essentially, the study optimizes the use of available data by using stock data for 
1990 and 2000 in OECD receiving countries, country of birth of migrants rather than nationality, and 
attempting by various mechanisms to standardize the data. The stocks of skilled foreign-born nationals 
are then related to population by educational level in the country of origin, using the UN population 
dataset (supplemented in some cases by the CIA World Factbook). The ratio gives a rough indicator of 
the emigration rate, i.e. how significant emigration of skilled personnel is for that country. Comparison 
with previous studies is made (pp. 192-194) and the authors conclude that faulty data on educational 
levels used in the older studies resulted in overestimation of the rate of skilled emigration for North 
Africa and Turkey, whilst seriously underestimating the rates for sub-Saharan Africa and, globally, small 
island countries.   18
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